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volume of research products—almost 600 published papers (e.g., technical reports, journal 
articles, theses)—indicates the extent to which the depth and breadth of acquisition 
research has increased during these years.  Over 300 authors contributed to these works, 
which means that the pool of those who have had significant intellectual engagement with 
acquisition issues has increased substantially.  The broad range of research topics includes 
acquisition reform, defense industry, fielding, contracting, interoperability, organizational 
behavior, risk management, cost estimating, and many others.  Approaches range from 
conceptual and exploratory studies to develop propositions about various aspects of 
acquisition, to applied and statistical analyses to test specific hypotheses.  Methodologies 
include case studies, modeling, surveys, and experiments.  On the whole, such findings 
make us both grateful for the ARP’s progress to date, and hopeful that this progress in 
research will lead to substantive improvements in the DoD’s acquisition outcomes. 
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researchers with practitioners on specific projects; requiring researchers to brief sponsors on 
project findings as a condition of funding award; “pushing” potentially high-impact research 
reports (e.g., via overnight shipping) to selected practitioners and policy-makers; and most 
notably, sponsoring this symposium, which we craft intentionally as an opportunity for 
fruitful, lasting connections between scholars and practitioners. 
A former Defense Acquisition Executive, responding to a comment that academic 
research was not generally useful in acquisition practice, opined, “That’s not their [the 
academics’] problem—it’s ours [the practitioners’].  They can only perform research; it’s up 
to us to use it.”  While we certainly agree with this sentiment, we also recognize that any 
research, however theoretical, must point to some termination in action; academics have a 
responsibility to make their work intelligible to practitioners.  Thus we continue to seek 
projects that both comport with solid standards of scholarship, and address relevant 
acquisition issues.  These years of experience have shown us the difficulty in attempting to 
balance these two objectives, but we are convinced that the attempt is absolutely essential if 
any real improvement is to be realized. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
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Abstract 
Frequent and substantial cost overruns in Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
(MDAP) have been criticized by the administration, lawmakers, and taxpayers. 
Critics often blame the dominant use of cost-plus contracts in the defense 
procurement system as the root cause of the inefficiency. In turn, a strong preference 
for fixed-price contracts as opposed to cost-plus contracts has been expressed on 
multiple occasions. In this research, we highlight the possible unintended 
consequences of advocating wider use of fixed-price contracts in Department of 
Defense (DoD) acquisitions. The implication of this study is that the mindset that 
fixed-price contracts are better than cost-plus contracts is misleading and can 
potentially do more harm than good in DoD major weapon system acquisition. 
Introduction 
Cost overruns in Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP)1 have become more 
frequent and more significant in recent years. In 2008, a Government Accountability Office 
(GAO, 2009) study found that approximately 70% of 96 MDAP were experiencing huge cost 
overruns, reaching over $295 billion (a 26% overrun) over the life of the projects. As a result, 
a series of legislative and executive efforts have been undertaken to address the cost 
efficiency problem in the gargantuan defense procurement system since President Barack 
                                                
1 MDAPs are programs that are estimated by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics to require an eventual total expenditure for research development, test, and evaluation of more than 
$365 million, including all planned increments, based on fiscal year 2000 constant dollars (approximately $509 
million in fiscal year 2010 dollars); $2.190 billion of procurement funding, including all planned increments 
(approximately $3.054 billion in fiscal year 2010 dollars); or are designated as a major defense acquisition 
program by the milestone decision authority.   
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Obama took office. For example, the Congress unanimously passed the Weapon Systems 
Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA), which was signed into law by President Obama on May 
22, 2009. WSARA presents a new approach to contain cost increases across the military 
Services’ new weapon systems. Some in Congress state that the Act represents the most 
dramatic changes to the defense acquisition system in twenty years. From the White House, 
President Barack Obama issued the Memorandum on Government Contracting on March 4, 
2009 to urge federal contracting agencies to improve the effectiveness of their acquisition 
practices and contracting performance. Top Pentagon officials also echoed their support of 
improving cost efficiency within an increasingly resource-constrained environment.2 
One widely held belief behind the wave of dissatisfaction over the defense 
procurement system is a strong dislike of the popular use of cost-plus contracts. The critics’ 
view is that cost-plus contracts effectively give a blank check to contractors and are the root 
cause of cost inefficiency. Naturally, they in turn become the strong proponents of the 
alternative fixed-price contracts. For example, the Presidential Memorandum explicitly stated 
that “there shall be a preference for fixed-price type contracts” (Obama, 2009, p. 1). Not 
surprisingly, Ashton Carter, the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), in his interview with 
Bloomberg’s Peter Cook on September 14, 2010, expressed his support of “increasing the 
use of fixed-price contracts” (Carter, 2010). Mr. Carter also requested the Defense Business 
Board (DBB, 2010) form a task group to provide recommendations on how the DoD might 
better utilize fixed-price contracts. He asked the task group to “consider the use of fixed-
price contracting across the full spectrum of the acquisition life cycle and provide 
recommendations based on best business practices, on when and how fixed-price 
contracting might provide savings and reduce risk.” Mr. Carter also requested the task group 
to “develop a rule set for using fixed-price contracts over other contract types.” This clearly 
demonstrates that the Pentagon’s senior policymakers’ preference for fixed-price contracts 
spans the full spectrum of the acquisition process and goes beyond a conceptual favor to an 
operational level. In summary, the policy push in favor of fixed-price contracts is strong and 
is being implemented. 
It is our concern that the ongoing policy push toward fixed-price contracts may 
already go too far. In this paper, we will highlight the possible unintended consequences of 
advocating wider use of fixed-price contracts in the DoD acquisition context. The implication 
to policymakers is that fixation on the mindset that fixed-price contracts are better than cost-
plus contracts is misleading and can potentially do more harm than good in DoD major 
weapon systems acquisition practice. 
The Unique Contracting Environment of the DoD 
The DoD is both the biggest and the most unique federal contracting agency. In 
contrast to a typical commercial contracting scenario, where many bidders compete to make 
an objective market price readily available, the DoD contracting environment is 
characterized by the following unique features: 
                                                
2 “The attacks of September 11, 2001, opened a gusher of defense spending that nearly doubled the base 
budget over the last decade.… (Now) the gusher has been turned off, and will stay off for a good period of 
time…. Therefore, as the Defense Department begins the process of preparing next year’s Fiscal 2012 budget 
request, I am directing the military services, the joint staff, the major functional and regional commands, and the 
civilian side of the Pentagon to take a hard, unsparing look at how they operate- in substance and style alike. 
The goal is to cut our costs and to transfer those savings to force structure and modernization within the 
programmed budget” (Gates, 2010).    
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1. Defense contractors normally face substantive business risks, which if not 
shared by the government, could be prohibitively high. Such risks stem from 
extreme difficulty and uncertainty in major weapon systems’ design, 
development, and production. Other contributing factors are changing the 
DoD requirements (often a moving rather than static target) and changing the 
integration process between the development and manufacturing as well as 
between the prime contractor and the sub-contractors. Additional risks arise 
from the compliance costs associated with federal acquisition policies and the 
scrutiny from federal agencies. The cost burden for establishing a 
government-unique infrastructure and disclosures of cost and pricing data 
and other business sensitive information surely elevates the contractors’ 
discomfort level.  
2. The DoD is the sole buyer in major weapon systems acquisition. Being the 
sole buyer presents two implications. First, defense contractors’ technological 
investments and capital expenditures, often huge due to the complexity of the 
tasks, only produce non-transferable assets and hence add even more risk to 
the firm. Second, the economy of scale, usually achieved through a large 
base of demand, is less likely to materialize. In the last two decades, the 
consolidation of firms in the defense industry3 is an indication of the firms’ 
struggle to achieve a better economy of scale4 through the supply side.  
3. The DoD contracting environment is not only a “sole-buyer” case, but also 
involves a “sole-seller” setting. Due to the extreme complexity and uncertainty 
inherent in major weapon systems, the long evolution and competition often 
result in a sole-source contractor situation in which only one (or a few 
contractors) is (are) capable of undertaking the contract. Other contributing 
factors to the sole-source situation include the DoD’s need for secrecy, 
expediency, and/or safeguarding human resources. We emphasize that the 
DoD’s unique sole-source contracting environment is unlikely to change 
anytime soon. For MDAPs, spending on single-source contracts in recent 
years has increased considerably from 76% in 2004 to 87% in 2008 (Berteau, 
Hofbauer, & Sanok, 2010). The economic downturn since 2008, coupled with 
ongoing DoD cost-saving initiatives (fueled by the pressure of reducing the 
federal budget deficit) will likely induce a new wave of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) and, in turn, reduce competition. Hence, the industry 
consolidation trend we have witnessed during the past two decades (e.g., 
Boeing acquired McDonnell Douglas, Lockheed acquired Martin Marietta, and 
Northrop acquired Grumman) may continue despite the WSARA effort to 
promote competition. We emphasize that this seemingly sub-optimal sole-
source industry structure, that is, monopoly or at most oligopoly, may actually 
offer the best solution. The huge risk associated with being the sole buyer as 
well as the enormous uncertainty in R&D, justifies the higher rate of return, 
which can be partly achieved through a more concentrated industry structure 
and a higher economy of scale. Hence, while we understand and appreciate 
the ongoing DoD efforts to promote competition and therefore a better 
                                                
3 Throughout the 1990s, hundreds of defense contractors disappeared in a massive consolidation. According to 
a Bureau of Labor Statistics study by economist Allison Thomson, federal and civilian defense employment fell 
by almost 3.35 million jobs between 1987 and 2005.  
4 Hensel (2010) found that greater efficiencies followed the defense industry consolidation.  
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established market price, such efforts may not yield meaningful results. 
Perhaps we should acknowledge that the observed defense contracting 
environment is a natural choice of economic Darwinism, which we must 
accommodate.  
4. Significant information asymmetry exists between the DoD and the defense 
contractors in such a unique sole-buyer and sole-seller case. As a result, 
agency problems arise from the conflict of interest, and the defense 
acquisition system is subject to abuses from contractors. 
To summarize, the DoD contracting environment is unique in the sense that an 
MDAP contract is typically a sole-buyer and sole-seller case, in which market competitive 
forces rarely exist and significant information asymmetry and potential agency problems 
prevail. On the contractor side, the business risk is too enormous to be borne by contractors 
themselves. On the government side, the major concern is the potential abuse of the 
system, which stems from the agency problems due to information asymmetry. 
Unintended Consequences of Advocating Wider Use of Fixed-Price Contracts 
in the DoD Context 
As argued in the introduction, currently there is a strong preference among 
lawmakers as well as policymakers for increased use of fixed-price contracts in the defense 
procurement system. While we acknowledge that fixed-price contracts may be superior in 
certain situations, such situations are quite limited in defense contracts. More commonly, the 
DoD faces a “single-source” contracting environment in which competition does not exist or 
is very low and significant information asymmetry prevails. Fixed-price contracts in these 
settings may not be effective. In the following, we highlight the possible unintended 
consequences of advocating wider use of fixed-price contracts in the DoD acquisition 
context. 
Unintended Consequence #1: Fixed-Price Contracts Do Not Provide Risk-Sharing 
Benefits 
A contracting firm given a fixed-price contract would bear all the risks. Hence, the 
first unintended consequence of fixed-price contracts is the absence of a risk-sharing benefit 
provided to the contractors by the government. Because the business risks associated with 
major weapon systems are very high, it is vital to ensure that the risk is shared by the 
government so the private contractors have incentive to undertake the highly risky projects 
that are essential to the national security and necessary for winning military conflicts. 
Without risk sharing by the government, it is unavoidable that certain important but risky 
projects would be forgone by the contractors because the uncertainty is too high to be borne 
by contractors themselves. 
Unintended Consequence #2: Fixed-Price Contracts May Lead to Higher Government 
Payments 
The logic behind the preference for fixed-price contracts, which may sound sensible 
at first glance, is fundamentally flawed in the DoD context. The proponents of fixed-price 
contracts normally assume that a reasonable cost estimate is available in most DoD 
contracting scenarios, but this assumption rarely holds in MDAP situations. On the contrary, 
ex ante, neither the government nor the contractor possesses the necessary information to 
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form a good cost estimate. However, the contractor has an informational advantage on cost 
estimation. 
The impact on the contractors’ incentives in the case of fixed-price contracts is 
twofold. First, to ensure against great downstream uncertainty, the contractor will tend to 
provide the government with a high cost estimate to obtain a higher fixed-price contract. 
This is a typical “risk-premium” story. A rational risk-averse contractor will submit a higher-
than-expected cost estimate and hence, on average, the government will pay more for a 
fixed-price contract than for a cost-plus contract. 
Second, due to information asymmetry, the contractor has both motive and ability to 
artificially inflate the cost estimate to command additional “information rents.” The combined 
demand for risk premium and the desire to extract information rents determine that there is 
no guarantee that taxpayers will be better off in a fixed-price contract as opposed to a cost-
plus contract. We expect that, in general, a fixed-price contract in the absence of a market-
established price and information symmetry will lead to a higher payment from the 
government than under a cost-plus contract. 
In addition, the cost of extracting information rents in a fixed-price contract is smaller 
than that for a cost-plus contract. This is because under the cost-plus scheme the contractor 
must incur the actual costs in order to get reimbursed. Whereas, the manipulation of the 
cost estimate under a fixed-price contract has little tangible cost. So, ceteris paribus, in a 
fixed-price contracting environment, the contractor has a stronger, not a weaker, incentive to 
extract information rents, provided that information asymmetry makes it difficult for the 
government to dispute the inflated cost estimate. 
A recent study by the Defense Business Board (DBB) indicated that cost overruns 
and schedule delays are less related to the contract types, but more related to the poor 
assessment of risks, inadequate planning of requirements, cost realism, stability of 
requirements, and quality of program leadership. This casts doubt on the popular critique 
that cost-plus contracts, which dominate MDAPs, primarily contribute to the huge and 
frequent cost overruns. Moreover, there is no evidence showing that those programs under 
fixed-price contracts necessarily result in higher cost efficiency. 
Unintended Consequence #3: Fixed-Price Contracts May Promote Inefficient Industry 
Structure 
Motivated by the preference toward fixed-price contracts and the worry about 
frequent no-bid defense contracts, policymakers are eager to promote a more competitive 
defense industry structure. The intention is good and justified: A market price established by 
the competitive forces needs to be present for fixed-price contracts to work. For instance, 
concerning acquisition process changes, WSARA encourages competition. Specifically, § 
202 requires the Secretary of Defense to take measures to ensure competition at both the 
prime contract level and the subcontract level throughout the life cycle of a program “as a 
means to improve contractor performance” (p. 19). Available measures include the following: 
(1) competitive prototyping (at system or subsystem level) is required prior to a Milestone B 
(Engineering & Manufacturing development) decision; (2) dual-sourcing; (3) unbundling of 
contracts; (4) using modular, open architectures to enable competition for upgrades; and (5) 
the licensing of additional suppliers. Prime contractors are also required to ensure their 
“make-or-buy” decisions give “full-and-fair consideration” to qualified sources other than 
themselves for major subsystems and components. 
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Moreover, WSARA legislation tries to nurture competition through more tightly 
controlling Organizational Conflict of Interest (OCI). OCI exists when a contractor can unduly 
benefit from its existing relationship in competitions for future work. Of particular concern to 
critics of the current system were situations in which contractors providing system 
engineering, technical services, or administrative support to the government were able to 
define the terms of future competitions or influence the source selection in a way to benefit 
themselves. While this concern about the inappropriate conflict of interest is justifiable, a 
draconian approach to OCI can create significant unintended negative consequences. One 
notable critique came from Goure (2010): 
The pool of expertise in sophisticated system engineering and technical analysis 
for complex, often highly classified defense areas is quite limited. There is only 
one Skunk works for example. But if a company such as Lockheed Martin is 
barred from working on the next stealth fighter or SR-71 because it has helped in 
the initial research and development effort, the nation will be the loser.5  
All the efforts above, though well intentioned, may promote inefficient industry 
structure. The conventional economic wisdom that a competitive industry structure is better 
than a more concentrated one may simply be untrue in the special defense industry. 
Policymakers need to be reminded that the single-source contracting environment is a 
natural result of long-term competition among contractors and the evolution of the free 
market economy. It is an optimal response to the unique features of the DoD major weapon 
systems acquisition environment. Specifically, extreme complexity and difficulty of the 
projects eliminate most competitions over time; the lack of an economy scale mechanism 
from the demand side makes industry consolidation the only option to achieve cost 
efficiency from the supply side; and the abnormally high business risks require a higher rate 
of return, which can be partly realized from a monopoly or oligopoly industry structure.  
To conclude, the present industry structure is an outcome of economic Darwinism 
and perhaps the best choice we have given the one-of-a-kind DoD contracting setting. An 
artificial effort to change the status quo and the policy push to reverse the industry 
consolidation trend are likely to be counter-productive and fail. 
Cost-plus Contracts: Problems and Remedies 
The Problems 
The pros and cons of cost-plus versus fixed-price contracts have been extensively 
investigated in the extant literature (Chapman & Ward, 1994a, b; Loeb & Surysekar, 1994). 
In general, fixed-price contracts are optimal if little uncertainty exists in technological 
requirements and developments. In the section titled Unintended Consequences of 
Advocating Wider Use of Fixed-Price Contracts in the DoD Context, we point out that the 
DoD contracting environment rarely offers this confidence. The Army Future Combat System 
(FCS; DoD, 2009), one example of many MDAPs, provides an excellent illustration of a 
system of complex electronic weapon systems that proved too difficult to design and 
                                                
5 “Skunk Works is an official alias for Lockheed Martin’s Advanced Development Programs (ADP), formerly 
called Lockheed Advanced Development Projects. Skunk Works is responsible for a number of famous aircraft 
designs, including the U-2, the SR-71 Blackbird, the F-117 Nighthawk, and the F-22 Raptor…. The designation 
‘skunk works’ … is widely used in business, engineering, and technical fields to describe a group 
within an organization given a high degree of autonomy and unhampered by bureaucracy, tasked 
with working on advanced or secret projects” (“Skunk Works,” 2010). 
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implement within growing budgets. Similarly, the Navy’s modular Littoral Combat Ship (LCS; 
GAO, 2010) is an ongoing struggle to merge functionality and technology and stay within 
cost estimates. 
In the previous examples of high uncertainty and emerging technology, risk sharing 
is vital to motivate private contractors to engage in complex defense projects. Hence, cost-
plus contracts are preferred to fixed-price contracts because they effectively shift the risk 
from the contractor to the government. 
However, the benefits of risk sharing associated with cost-plus contracts come with a 
price. Because cost-plus contracts are most often applied to the projects with high 
uncertainty and information asymmetry, they are subject to the contractor’s manipulation of 
cost reporting. Critics basically argue that the contractor has a blank check from the 
government, and hence they have little incentive to contain cost. Moreover, under a 
particular form of cost-plus contracts, in which the contracting firm’s profit is a fixed 
percentage of the cost, the contractor would have strong incentive to inflate the cost. Even 
when the profit is a pre-specified fixed dollar amount, the contracting firm as well as the 
management of the firm may be able to derive some private benefits from incurring a larger 
cost. One possible example is the “empire building” behavior that rewards managers by 
growing a firm beyond the optimal level (Jensen, 1986; 1989).6 Hence, cost-plus contracts 
could lead to potential abuse of the system and cost inefficiency. This problem basically 
underlies the major arguments made by critics. 
The Remedies 
In this section, we introduce to policymakers that a traditional cost-plus incentive 
contract can be refined such that the new form of contract not only keeps the conventional 
risk-sharing benefits, but also aligns the contractor’s incentive with the incentive of the 
government. This new type of contract is called “budget-based cost-plus scheme,” which 
belongs to the larger topic of menu of contracts discussed in the literature. This body of 
literature has broad applications in executive compensation contracts, regulation, and 
government procurement contracts (Laffont & Tirole, 1986, 1993; McAfee & McMillan, 1987; 
Melumad & Reichelstein, 1989; Reichelstein, 1992). 




                                                
6 “Managers have many incentives to expand company size beyond that which maximizes shareholder wealth. 
Compensation is one of the most important incentives. Many studies document that increases in executive pay 
are strongly related to increases in corporate size rather than value. The tendency of companies to reward 
middle managers through promotions rather than annual performance bonuses also creates a cultural bias 
toward growth. Organizations must grow in order to generate new positions to feed their promotion-based reward 
systems. Finally, corporate growth enhances the social prominence, public prestige, and political power of senior 
executives. Rare is the CEO who wants to be remembered as presiding over an enterprise that makes fewer 
products in fewer plants in fewer countries than when he or she took office-even when such a course increases 
productivity and adds hundreds of millions of dollars of shareholder value. The perquisites of the executive suite 
can be substantial, and they usually increase with company size” (Jensen, 1989, p. 66). 
)(ccP π+=
)(*)( cTCc −+= βαπ
 =
=
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Note that P  is the price paid by the government to the contractor; c is the actual 
reported cost as agreed by the auditor; and )(cπ is the contractor’s profit, which includes a 
target profit α , and an incentive term for cost overruns (or underruns) above (below) a pre-
specified target cost TC . The parameter β (a positive coefficient between 0 and 1) is the 
cost share parameter. Because the profit is penalized (rewarded) when there exists a cost 
overrun (underrun), the contractor is motivated to be more cost efficient. 
The primary drawback of the traditional cost-plus-incentive contract is that the 
government frequently does not possess necessary information to form a basis for 
estimating target cost TC due to significant information asymmetry. If TC is set too high, the 
contractor receives windfall bonuses at the expense of taxpayers. On the other hand, if 
TC is set too low such that the cost overrun is unavoidable, the contractor will be unfairly 
penalized. 
Contractors (firms) usually have superior information concerning the expected cost of 
the project, yet the government cannot rely on the firms’ estimates because contractors, as 
agents, may not truthfully reveal their beliefs due to the conflict of interests. One possible 
remedy to this dilemma is to introduce an optimal design of incentive contracts to ensure 
that the contractors (who have an information advantage) voluntarily and truthfully reveal 
their beliefs about the project’s estimated cost. The theoretical setting is the classical 
principal–agent contracting model where the principal (i.e., the government) carefully 
designs the contract format, such that the agents (i.e., the contractors), in maximizing their 
own benefits, behave in the way that the principal desires.  
Consider a refinement of the traditional cost-plus incentive contract in which the task 
of estimating target cost shifts from the government to the better informed contractor. Thus, 
Equation 2 is modified as follows: 
(3) 
where TC is the estimate of TC submitted by the contractor. 
Another important modification is that both α (target profit) and β (cost share 
parameter) are no longer constants. Instead, they vary with TC  to provide the correct 
incentives for the contractors to truthfully reveal their unbiased cost estimate. 
It can be shown
7
 that if the functional forms of )(TCα and )(TCβ are carefully 
chosen, a contract in the form of Equation 1 and Equation 3 would desirably induce the 
“truth-telling” behavior. 
For instance, consider: 
(4) 
where the government will set the constant N as an input to target profit. 
(5) 
                                                
7 Proof available upon request. 
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Now, by Equation 3, the menu of contracts presented to the firm by the government is as 
follows: 
(6) 
Without losing any generality, assume that the contracting firm has the following 
private information, which is unknown to the government: c, as a random variable, has three 
equally possible outcomes: 50, 100, and 150. Therefore, the unbiased cost estimate is 100. 
The contractor has three choices in terms of submitting the budget (target cost): either tell 
the truth (i.e., 100=TC ) or underreport (without losing generality, let’s assume 50=TC ), 
or overreport (without losing generality, let’s assume 150=TC ). The decision problem for 
the contracting firm facing this particular budget-based cost-plus scheme reduces to the 
following in Figure 1, where the firm’s profit under each combination of TC  and c is 
calculated based on Equation 6. Then for each TC , the probability weighted expected profit 
is computed. The firm will choose TC  to maximize its expected profit. In our example, the 
contractor’s expected profit is maximized by submitting 100=TC , which is exactly the firm’s 
unbiased cost estimate. Equivalently stated, the firm voluntarily and truthfully revealed 
private information and hence reduced information asymmetry. 
 
Firm’s Profit 







Firm’s Expected Profit 
 
TC  
(target cost budget ) 
50 N/50 0 -N/50 0 (underreport) 
110 3N/200 N/100 N/200 N/100 (tell the truth) 
150 N/90 2N/225 N/150 2N/225 (overreport) 
Figure 1. An Example of Budget-Based Cost-Plus Scheme (i.e., Equations 1 & 6) 
Inducing the Contractor’s Truth-Telling Behavior 
The budget-based cost-plus scheme represents a contracting scenario in which the 
government (the principal) presents the sole-source contracting firm (the agent) a menu of 
contracts based on target cost (budget) submitted by the firm (TC ) and the firm’s actual 
reported cost ( c ; as shown in Equation 3). In practice, the firm is given a payoff matrix 
based on certain combinations of its submitted budget and the actual cost incurred. The 
firm, as demonstrated above, will choose its best unbiased estimate of the project cost to 
submit as the budgeted target cost in order to maximize its own benefit. The government, 
therefore, avoids potential overpayment to the firm, which may occur under traditional cost-












In this study, we highlighted the unintended consequences of advocating increased 
use of fixed-price contracts in DoD major weapon systems acquisition. As a policy 
implication, we caution the Pentagon that the fixation on the mindset that fixed-price 
contracts are better than cost-plus contracts in limiting cost overruns is dangerous and could 
potentially do more harm than good to acquisition reform.  
Cost-plus contracts should remain as a major contracting tool in MDAPs to facilitate 
the implementation of major weapon systems projects that are otherwise too risky to be 
undertaken by defense contractors. Moreover, we demonstrate that the contractors’ 
opportunistic cost misbehavior under traditional cost-plus contracts can be mitigated by 
using the budget-based cost-plus scheme. 
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